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Abstract The objective of this study was to determine the
costs and benefits of the MRSA Search and Destroy policy in
a Dutch hospital during 2001 through 2006. Variable costs
included costs for isolation, contact tracing, treatment of
carriers and closure of wards. Fixed costs were the costs for
the building of isolation rooms and the salary of one full-time
infection control practitioner. To determine the benefits of the
Search and Destroy policy, the transmission rate during the
study period was calculated. Furthermore, the number of cases
of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bac-
teraemia prevented was estimated, as well as its associated
prevented costs and patient lives. The costs of the MRSA
policy were estimated to be €215,559 a year, which equals
€5.54 per admission. The daily isolation costs for MRSA-
suspected and -positive hospitalised patients were €95.59
and €436.62, respectively. Application of the Search and
Destroy policy resulted in a transmission rate of 0.30 and
was estimated to prevent 36 cases of MRSA bacteraemia per
year, resulting in annual savings of €427,356 for the hospital
and ten lives per year (95% confidence interval [CI] 8–14).
In conclusion, application of the MRSA Search and Destroy
policy in a hospital in a country with a low endemic MRSA
incidence saves money and lives.
Introduction
Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has
become an increasingly important pathogen in hospitals
worldwide and, recently, also in the community [1]. In the
Netherlands and in Scandinavian countries, the percentage
of S. aureus bacteraemia caused by MRSA is very low
(≤1%), contrary to other European countries that have
reached percentages of up to 50% [2]. The low incidence in
the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries is maintained
by an active Search and Destroy (S&D) policy, outlined in
the national guidelines of the Dutch Working Party on
Infection Prevention (WIP) [3]. The main aspects of the
S&D policy are the screening and isolation of patients
considered at increased risk for the carriage of MRSA. This
policy mainly affected persons that have been treated in a
hospital abroad. However, since July 2006, a new group
has been added, i.e. patients with exposure to pigs or veal
calves [4, 5]. Isolation is performed in a room with an
anteroom, where health care workers (HCWs) must put on
their personal protective equipment (PPE; mask, hat, gown
and gloves). Because MRSA can be transmitted by air, an
air pressure gradient (−15 Pascal in the room, −7.5 Pa in the
anteroom and 0 Pa in the corridor) is required to prevent
airflow (which may contain MRSA) from the room to the
corridor. Carriers of MRSA (both patients and HCWs) are
treated with antibiotics, which are described in the guide-
lines of the Dutch Working Party on Antibiotic Policy
(SWAB) [6]. Up till now, few studies have estimated the
costs and benefits of the S&D policy [7, 8]. The objective
of this study was to determine the costs and benefits of the
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S&D policy in a large teaching hospital, the Amphia
hospital, in a country with a low MRSA prevalence. The
S&D policy in the Amphia hospital is based entirely on the
national MRSA guideline from the WIP [3]. The imple-
mentation of the guideline is controlled by the Inspection
for Healthcare.
Materials and methods
Setting
This analysis was performed at the Amphia hospital, a
teaching hospital with 1,370 beds. All medical specialties
are present. The hospital is located in the south-western part
of the Netherlands and serves a population of ~440,000
inhabitants. During the study period, on average, 38,943
patients were admitted annually to this hospital, with
282,585 patient days per year (mean numbers for the
period 2001 through 2006).
MRSA screening and confirmation
Culture swabs were inoculated on a blood agar plate and in
a broth enrichment. Culture plate and broth enrichment
were incubated at 35–37°C overnight. After 1 day, the broth
enrichment was inoculated on a blood culture plate and a
mannitol salt agar plate with oxacillin (2 mg/l). Colonies
which were suspected for S. aureus were tested by a latex
agglutination test and the susceptibility for oxacillin was
determined on a Mueller-Hinton agar plate with 2% NaCL.
All strains were confirmed to be MRSA by polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) for the nuc gene and the mecA gene.
MRSA strains from all patients and HCWs were typed by
the Dutch National Reference Centre (RIVM, Bilthoven,
the Netherlands). This method was unchanged during the
study period.
Data collection
The data of all patients and HCWs that were found to be
carrying MRSA during the years 2001 through 2006 were
prospectively recorded in a database. The following items
were recorded: patient identification number, date of birth,
date of first MRSA-positive culture, MRSA pulsed-field gel
electrophoresis (PFGE) type, MRSA polymorphic X-region
of the protein A gene (Spa) type, MRSA source, whether
MRSA was found by targeted screening or by coincidence,
number of screened contact patients and HCWs (both
unprotected and protected contacts), number of secondary
cases, number of days that MRSA-positive HCWs were
suspended from work, whether MRSA treatment was given
and, if so, whether MRSA was eradicated.
Estimation of costs for the hospital
The costs of the MRSA S&D policy for the hospital in the
years 2001 through 2006 were based on real data extracted
from the above-mentioned data bank and other data
(isolation database and registration forms) of the infection
control department. First, costs were divided into variable
and fixed costs. The method for the estimation of the
variable costs is shown in Fig. 1. Cases were stratified
based on the location of the initial finding (inpatients or
outpatients clinic), if they were detected by targeted
screening or as a coincidental finding and whether
nosocomial spread had occurred. Costs for materials for
PPE (gown, gloves, mask and hat), screening cultures,
cleaning, salaries, missed patient days, MRSA eradication
treatment and the building of pressure-controlled isolation
rooms were requested from the financial department of the
hospital. To calculate the costs for PPE, the number of
isolation days and outpatient visits of MRSA-suspected and
-positive patients were extracted from the isolation database
of the infection control department. For inpatients, the
mean number of HCWs and visitors that entered the room
daily were extracted from the contact lists of the archives of
the infection control department. Treatment costs were
estimated based on the number of treatments given to the
MRSA-positive patients and HCWs. The mean costs were
€100 per treatment. Strain typing costs (€100/strain) were
not included in the costs analysis, as this is done in a
reference laboratory which is reimbursed by the govern-
ment and, in this study, the costs for the hospital were
estimated. The fixed costs were divided into costs for
the building of pressure-controlled isolation rooms and the
salary of one full-time infection control practitioner. The
costs of the microbiologist, who acts as the infection
control physician as well, were included in the culture
costs. Ten percent was added to the total costs for
overheads and for costs that could not be estimated, for
example, costs for disposables that had to be thrown away
and for additional HCWs that were asked to work when an
MRSA-positive patient was present on their ward.
Furthermore, the additional daily isolation costs for
isolated patients and additional costs for unexpected
MRSA-positive cases were estimated. Treatment costs were
excluded in these analyses. To estimate the daily isolation
costs for MRSA-positive and -suspected patients, the total
variable isolation costs were divided by the total number of
patients that had been appropriately isolated. The mean
length of stay for MRSA-positive and -suspected patients
was calculated and used to estimate the daily isolation
costs. Fixed costs for building isolation rooms were divided
by the total number of isolation days and added to the mean
daily isolation costs. To estimate the additional costs that
have to be made for patients and HCWs that were
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unexpectedly found to carry MRSA, the total variable costs
for unexpected MRSA cases were divided by the number of
patients and HCWs that were found to be MRSA-positive
by coincidence. These additional costs were estimated for
both the cases with and without nosocomial transmission.
Estimation of benefits
To estimate the effect of the S&D policy in our hospital, the
transmission rate (secondary cases/index cases) during the
study period was calculated. Secondary cases were cases of
patients and HCWs who were colonised by MRSA due to
nosocomial transmission. When an MRSA-positive case
found in the hospital could be linked in time (overlap in the
dates of patient days with a maximal interval of 30 days)
and place (overlap in wards, including adjacent wards) to
an index patient or HCW and the MRSA strains were
indistinguishable to the strain of the index, the source of the
case was classified as nosocomial transmission. When no
link in time and place could be found, the case was
classified as an index case.
Furthermore, the benefits of the situation under applica-
tion of the S&D policy was compared to a situation in
which the Netherlands would have never applied the S&D
policy. Therefore, the mean annual number of patients with
a nosocomial S. aureus bacteraemia that could be prevented
and its associated saved costs and the number of patient
lives that could be saved by application of the S&D policy
was estimated. This was based on the annual number of
patients with a nosocomial S. aureus bacteraemia found in
the Amphia hospital. Patients suffering from a S. aureus
bacteraemia were identified in the laboratory information
system. Data were available for the years after the
implementation of this information system, i.e. 2004
Fig. 1 Estimation of the vari-
able costs of the Search and
Destroy (S&D) policy
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Table 1 Costs of the MRSA Search and Destroy policy in 2001 through 2006
Number Costs (€) 2001–2006
total costs (€)
Variable costs:
1. Isolation costs
MRSA-suspected patients (324 admissions)
PPE (gown, gloves, mask, hat for HCWs
and visitors
6 (= mean contact list) + 5/day 1.86/set
1,446 isolation days 20.46/day 29,585.16
Screening of patients 324×4 cultures = 1,296 29/culture 37,584.00
Subtotal of isolation costs for
MRSA-suspected patients
67,169.16
MRSA-positive patients (90 admissions)
PPE for HCWs and visitors 6 (= mean contact list) + 5/day 1.86/set
644 isolation days 20.46/day 13,176.24
Screening of patients 90×4 cultures = 360 29/culture 10,440.00
Screening of HCWs (protected contacts
(= with PPE))
84 HCWs (= mean contact list) ×
90 admissions = 7,560
29/culture 219,240.00
Cleaning after discharge 90 h 50/h 4,500.00
Subtotal of isolation costs for
MRSA-positive patients
247,356.24
Costs of outpatients clinic visits
(MRSA-positive and -suspected patients)
936/6 year
PPE for HCWs 1,872 1.86/set 3,481.92
Screening of HCWs (protected contacts) 1,872 29/culture 54,288.00
Cleaning after visit 936 50/h 46,800.00
Screening of patients 936×4 cultures = 3,744 29/culture 108,576.00
Subtotal of isolation costs in the outpatients clinic 213,145.92
Subtotal of isolation costs 527,671.32
2. Costs of coincidental findings in the inpatients
clinic without nosocomial spreading
27 patients and 4 HCWs
Screening of patients (unprotected contacts) 1,264 cultures 29/culture 36,656.00
Screening of HCWs (unprotected contacts) 1,226 cultures 29/culture 35,554.00
Cleaning 27 rooms 50/h 1,350.00
Day offs of MRSA-positive HCWs
(job taken into account)
133 days 90/day 11,970.00
Subtotal of costs 85,530.00
3. Costs of coincidental findings in the
inpatients clinic with nosocomial spreading
2 outbreaks (14 patients and 9 HCWs)
Screening of patients (unprotected contacts) 360 cultures 29/culture 10,440.00
Screening of HCWs (unprotected contacts) 777 cultures 29/culture 22,533.00
Screening of the environment
(e.g. floor, disposables)
198 cultures 29/culture 5,742.00
Cleaning 257 h 50/h 12,850.00
Admission halt in outbreak situation 55 days 385/day at ward 21,175.00
Day offs of MRSA-positive HCWs
(job taken intoaccount)
215 days 90/day 19,350.00
Subtotal of costs 92,090.00
4. Costs of coincidental findings
in the outpatientsclinic
16 patients
Screening of HCWs (unprotected contacts) 211 29/culture 6,119.00
Screening of patients (when HCWs is positive) 0 0
Cleaning 0 0
Subtotal of costs 6,119.00
5. Treatment costs 12 HCWs with 14 treatments
32 patients with 44 treatments
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through 2006. Each first S. aureus-positive blood sample of
a patient was included; further positive samples were
excluded. Samples taken from patients at the dialysis
department were excluded because, in this patient popula-
tion, it is difficult to determine whether the bacteraemia was
acquired in the hospital or in the community. Bacteraemia
were defined to be nosocomial when the first positive blood
culture was sampled more than two days after admission.
To estimate the number of lives that could be saved, the
mortality rate during hospital stay was determined in
patients with a nosocomial S. aureus bacteraemia. The
assumption was made that, if no control measures would
have been implemented, 50% of the nosocomial S. aureus
bacteraemias would have been caused by MRSA, as is the
case in many countries that do not apply an MRSA S&D
policy [2]. The introduction of MRSA has been shown to
increase the absolute number of cases of nosocomial S.
aureus bacteraemia, as has been shown in the UK [9, 10].
So instead of replacement, MRSA adds to the existing
burden of disease. Associated costs were based on the
results of Cosgrove et al., who estimated the median
hospital costs for patients with MRSA bacteraemia to be
€11,871 ($14,655) [11]. This calculation was based on the
mean Dollar–Euro exchange rate of 2005, the year in which
the study of Cosgrove et al. was published [11]. In our
estimation of benefits, no difference in mortality between
bacteraemia due to MRSA or meticillin-susceptible S.
aureus) (MSSA) was taken into account.
Table 2 Mean additional costs per MRSA case and additional costs per isolation day during the period 2001 through 2006
n Isolation
days
Mean total variable
costs (€)/case
Mean length
of stay
Mean variable costs
(€)/isolation day
Mean fixed costs
(€)/isolation day
Total costs (€)/
isolation day
Inpatients clinic
MRSA-suspected patient in isolation 324 1,446 207.31 4.5 46.07 49.52 95.59
MRSA-positive patient in isolation 90 644 2,748.40 7.1 387.10 49.52 436.62
Coincidental finding without
nosocomial spread1
31 NA 2,759.03 NA NA NA NA
Outbreak situation (two outbreaks)1 23 NA 4,003.91 NA NA NA NA
Outpatients clinic
MRSA-positive/-suspected
patient in isolation2
936 NA 227.72 NA NA NA NA
Coincidental finding without
nosocomial spread
16 NA 382.44 NA NA NA NA
n=number; NA = not applicable
1 These costs are additional to the isolation costs
2 No data were available about the number of positive and suspected patients, so the costs could not be estimated for the separate groups
Table 1 (continued)
Number Costs (€) 2001–2006
total costs (€)
Treatment (topical or systemically) 58 treatments 100/treatment 5,800
Follow-up screening of treated
patients and HCWs
1,524 cultures 29/culture 44,196.00
Subtotal of costs 49,996.00
Fixed costs:
1. Salary of infection control practitioner (1 fte) 1 fte 51,661.5/year 309,969.00
2. Building isolations rooms
(debit from 20 years)
16 rooms 21,750/room 104,400.00
Subtotal of costs 414,369.00
Calculated costs from 2001 until 2006 1,175,775.32
Overheads: 10% 117,577.53
Total costs from 2001 until 2006 1,293,352.52
Costs per year 215,558.81
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Results
Costs of the MRSA policy
The total costs of the MRSA policy in the years 2001
through 2006 were calculated to be €1,293,353. This is, on
average, €215,559 per year. The costs are specified in
Table 1.
The mean variable costs per MRSA-positive or
-suspected case and costs per isolation day are shown in
Table 2. Figure 2 shows the costs for the separate items of
the S&D policy. The main costs are caused by costs for
screening and the salary of one full-time infection control
practitioner.
Benefits due to the MRSA policy
Two outbreaks occurred during the study period, both
caused by the same MRSA type (PFGE 55, Spa t003). The
first patient was a patient who had been transferred from a
hospital in Turkey. Unfortunately, this patient was not asked
whether he belonged to an MRSA risk category on
admission and was, therefore, not isolated until MRSA
was found in a clinical culture and spread had occurred.
Thirteen patients and nine HCWs were colonised by
nosocomial transmission during these two outbreaks. The
transmission rate during the study period was 0.30 (22
secondary cases/73 index cases).
In 2004 through 2006, the total number of patients that
developed a nosocomial bacteraemia caused by S. aureus
was 109 (mean 36 ± 10 per year), resulting in an incidence
density of 1.3/10,000 patient days (109/833,716). All of
these S. aureus strains were susceptible for meticillin.
Thirty-one of these patients (28.4%) died during their
hospital stay (mean of ten per year). Based on the
assumption of 50% MRSA prevalence caused entirely by
addition, 36 additional nosocomial bacteraemia would have
been caused by MRSA each year when no control measures
had been taken. Based on Cosgrove et al., the hospital costs
for these 36 MRSA bacteraemia would have been €427,356
[11]. With comparable MRSA and MSSA mortality rates,
this would have resulted in ten additional deaths (95%
confidence interval [CI] 8–14).
Discussion
Estimated costs
The costs of the S&D policy were estimated to be €215,559
per year, equivalent to €5.54 per admission or €0.76 per
patient day. This equals 0.08% of the hospital budget. The
estimated costs are comparable to the costs as estimated by
Vriens et al. [7]. The annual costs of the MRSA policy in
the University Medical Centre Utrecht during the years
1991 through 2000 were estimated to be €280,000.
Recently, Nulens et al. estimated the costs for pro-active
searching for MRSA in the University Hospital Maastricht
to be €1,383,200 per year [8]. This higher estimate is
mainly caused by more screening tests due to the extension
of the risk period from 2 to 6 months and the higher costs
per isolation day, i.e. costs for extra HCWs, disposables and
additional room cleaning. In our hospital, almost no
additional HCWs were asked to work, a stock of dispos-
ables for 24 h only was used and additional room cleaning
was only required after discharge of the patient instead of
Fig. 2 Costs of the different
items of the MRSA S&Destroy
policy in 2001 through 2006.
ICP = infection control
practitioner
1250 Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis (2009) 28:1245–1252
every day. Apparently, this approach is effective as well,
and is associated with much lower costs. In general, the
costs estimated for the Amphia hospital are representative
for all other Dutch hospitals, because they all follow the
S&D policy described in the WIP guideline [3]. Although
there may be variations between hospitals in the imple-
mentation of the guideline, these are minor.
This is the first study that estimated the additional costs
per MRSA-suspected or -positive case (Table 2). The daily
incremental costs for hospitalised patients in isolation were
relatively low, i.e. €436.62 for MRSA-positive patients and
€95.59 for MRSA-suspected patients. This difference can
be explained by the absence of screening of HCWs after
contact with MRSA-suspected patients. However, relatively
high additional costs have to be made for coincidental
findings who were not in isolation from the very start, i.e.
€2,759.03 for cases without nosocomial transmission and
€4,003.91 for cases with nosocomial transmission. It
confirms the importance to identify persons at risk for
MRSA carriage and to take control measures as soon as
possible.
In the Amphia hospital, the number of MRSA-positive
persons increased during this study period due to the
emergence of non-typable MRSA (NT-MRSA) [4]. This
type is related to a reservoir in pigs and veal calves [5]. As
this reservoir is now clearly established and is not likely to
decrease in the future, this will result in higher costs for the
MRSA policy, especially for the variable costs. In addition,
the costs described in this article are costs for an MRSA
S&D policy in a country with low endemic MRSA levels.
Costs that have to be made in a high prevalence setting will
be much higher, because, in that setting, it is impossible to
designate patients to a specific MRSA risk category. This
will require more extensive screening. Also, more isolation
rooms, PPE and MRSA eradication treatment are needed.
The best way to handle this is probably a stepwise
implementation. For example, the mathematical model of
Bootsma et al. showed that, starting with a limited number
of control measures (e.g. screening, precautionary isolation)
will reduce the MRSA rates in the hospital [12]. Based on
this model, it is estimated that application of the full S&D
policy in a high endemic setting will reduce endemic
prevalence levels to <1% within 6 years. However, the
screening of contact patients (with precautionary isolation)
of an index case will take, on average, 8 years to reach
endemic levels <1%.
Estimated benefits
During the study period, hardly any nosocomial trans-
missions occurred (transmission rate of 0.30), which shows
the effectiveness of the S&D policy in a country with a low
endemic MRSA incidence. Furthermore, the saving in costs
for the hospital and the number of patient lives saved based
on the prevention of MRSA bacteraemia was calculated to
estimate the benefits for the Amphia hospital. This is
extremely difficult, since it is not possible to determine
accurately what would have happened if no control
measures had been implemented in the Dutch situation.
Therefore, it has to be based upon assumptions that try to
translate the observed situation in countries with high rates
of MRSA to the countries with low rates. In countries that
did not implement the S&D policy, the number of cases of
bacteraemia caused by S. aureus increased when MRSA
emerged [10]. So MRSA added to the existing burden of
staphylococcal disease. If no S&D policy had been
implemented in our hospital, it was estimated that, annually,
36 cases of MRSA bacteraemia would be added to the
present 36 cases of MSSA bacteraemia. The S&D approach
prevents these events and this was estimated to result in an
annual saving of €211,797 (saved costs based on prevented
MRSA bacteraemia − costs for the application of the S&D
policy = €427,356 − €215,559) for the hospital and of 10
(95% CI 8–14) patient lives. This is probably an underes-
timation because of two reasons. First, there are indications
that there is a difference in the mortality rate between
bacteraemia caused by MRSA and MSSA [10, 13]. The
meta-analysis of Cosgrove et al. showed a significantly
higher mortality rate due to MRSA bacteraemia than due to
MSSA (odds ratio [OR] 1.88, 95% CI 1.33–2.69). Because
this increased mortality due to MRSA is under discussion,
we did not take it into account for our estimation of the
benefits. Second, this estimation focussed on bacteraemia
only and not on other infections caused by S. aureus. In the
USA, the mortality rate due to MRSA invasive infections
was estimated to be 6.3/100,000 inhabitants in 2005 [14].
The Amphia hospital serves a population of ~440,000
inhabitants. In accordance with the situation in the USA,
when no S&D policy would have been applied in the
Amphia hospital, 27 deaths due to invasive MRSA
infection would have occurred in 2005. This is higher than
the upper range of the confidence interval that we
estimated. Therefore, we consider this to be a conservative
estimate.
In conclusion, application of the MRSA S&D policy in a
hospital in a country with a low endemic MRSA incidence
saves money and lives.
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